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The Agency Advantage of Debt Over the 
Lifecycle of the Firm
Ed Vos 
Carolyn Forlong
The question of an ‘optimal’ capital structure of a firm has been studied for publicly 
listed businesses for years. From these studies, agency theory has emerged as a good 
way to understand a firm’s capital structure. This paper empirically examines the role 
that agency theory plays in determining the capital structure of businesses as they move 
from being small unlisted businesses to newly listed on the stock exchange, to being 
mature listed businesses. The paper finds that debt has a negative agency advantage 
(defined as reducing agency costs of equity) for small businesses, a significant but 
minor advantage at the IPO stage, and a significant advantage at the mature listed stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is generally accepted that debt financing is relevant to shareholder wealth, 
it is not known exactly how the role of debt financing changes at various stages of 
the firm’s development. Several capital structure theories have been developed 
and are based on the existence of market imperfections such as agency costs, taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and asymmetrical information. However, most of the discussion 
of these capital structure theories has been made with reference to listed businesses 
and it is uncertain how leverage relationships might differ at other stages of the 
business life cycle.
The purpose of this study is to empirically test the agency advantage of debt 
over the life cycle of the business. The agency advantage of debt is interpreted as 
the degree that debt benefits the firm by reducing the agency costs of equity. We 
expect that the changing ownership structures over the firm life cycle will cause 
the role of leverage to shift also, particularly at the small business stage where 
there is less separation between manager and owner, and at the IPO stage where a 
firm undergoes a process of greater diffusion of ownership.
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Consequently, we have divided the finn life cycle into three stages: the small 
business, the initial public offering (IPO), and the mature-listed stage. For the pur­
pose of this study, we define small businesses as unlisted businesses where the 
owner is also the manager of the firm. IPO firms are firms which have Usted on the 
stock exchange in the past year. Mature listed firms are those which have been 
listed on the stock exchange for five or more years.
Before testing the agency advantage of debt at the three stages, this paper 
reviews the current financial literature in order to understand capital structure the­
ories based on mature listed firms and the different characteristics of small busi­
nesses and IPO firms. The report then outlines the empirical tests of leverage in 
four data sets and comes to a conclusion about the changing agency advantage of 
debt. That is, the changing degree that debt benefits the owners by reducing agency 
costs of equity in small businesses, IPO firms and mature listed businesses.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Capital Structure Theory and Mature Listed Firms
Many studies have examined the benefits of leverage since the famous 
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (1958). The irrelevance proposition 
states that, in a perfect world without taxes, changes in leverage should have no 
effect on a firm’s value. However, the existence of market imperfections has led 
financial theorists to agree that an optimal capital structure does exist for each 
firm. There are four generally accepted theories which explain the significance of 
debt in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetrical information, and 
agency costs. These theories have all been tested and have found to be relevant to 
large listed businesses.
First, there is evidence that debt creates a tax shield advantage through interest 
payments, and this advantage is balanced by the cost of bankruptcy. This theory 
was supported by De Angelo and Masulis (1980) who found that capital structure 
in listed firms is related to the tax shield of debt. This idea is also supported by 
Givoly, Hayne, Ofer, and Sarig (1992) who documented a positive relationship 
between the debt ratio and tax rate changes. However, Homaifar, Zietz and Ben- 
kato (1994) find that the debt ratio relationship with the tax shield is only observ­
able in the long term, whereas Bayless and Diltz (1994) conclude that firms do not 
appear to be motivated by the tax advantage of debt. Therefore, while the tax 
advantage of debt is a simple and intuitive theory, the evidence suggests that there 
are many other considerations determining a firm’s optimal capital structure.
Second, the information hypothesis, popularized by Ross (1977), suggests that 
managers use capital structure to signal information about the firm’s expected 
future cashflows and operating risk. This hypothesis is confirmed by many
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studies' which have documented stock price increases when leverage increasing 
decisions are announced. The information hypothesis argues that this effect occurs 
due to asynmietrical information between managers and shareholders, and sug­
gests that managers are signalling information about the firm’s capacity to meet 
future interest payments.^
The information gap between management and shareholders leads to a third 
theory by Myers (1984) known as the pecking order hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests that managers will first seek to finance assets with the lowest cost financ­
ing available. Myers argues that managers will issue the least risky security avail­
able in order to reduce costs when new debt or equity is underpriced by 
uninformed investors. This theory implies that asymmetrical information leads to 
a hierarchy of preferred financing according to the relative costs of each security.
The pecking order hypothesis is supported by Bay less and Diltz (1994) who 
found that debt is more likely to be issued after a fall in interest rates, and equity is 
more likely to be issued when a firm’s growth opportunities are high. Bayless and 
Diltz conclude that equity offerings are timed for favorable market conditions, 
when the cost of equity becomes cheaper than additional debt. Thus they provide 
evidence that relative costs of each financial instrument are motivating factors in 
the use of financing.
Finally, the agency theory focuses on how the gap between management and 
ownership can lead to conflicting interests between managers, bond holders, and 
owners. This theory is based on the idea that managers will not always act in the 
best interests of the investors. For instance, managers may seek to consume “per­
quisites” and decrease their work load if the cost of doing so is mainly absorbed by 
the investor. Consequently, agency costs consist of the monitoring, bonding, and 
auditing of managerial performance by both debt holders and shareholders. 
Agency theory proposes that debt reduces agency costs incurred by shareholders 
through increased managerial monitoring and pressure to meet interest payments.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were one of the first to suggest that debt forces 
agents to take more care with their investments and that it reduces agency costs by 
performing a monitoring role valuable to investors. They argue that the existence 
of agency costs for both debt and equity results in an optimal capital structure 
which minimizes the combined agency costs. The agency theory is also supported 
by Grossman and Hart (1982), who argue that financial leverage can reduce 
agency costs by increasing the possibility of bankruptcy and providing a manage­
rial discipline.
Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) confirmed that debt enhances man­
agerial decision making by finding that firms with higher leverage outperform oth­
ers in the acquisition market. Ofek and Eli (1993) also found that leverage 
increases the probability of operational and financial actions, such as labor cut­
backs, in the first year of financial distress.
Agency Advantage of Debt 195
In summary, debt does not only play a role in providing an additional source 
of funds, but it also benefits mature listed firms through reducing asymmetrical 
information, creating a tax shield, improving managerial efficiency and reducing 
agency costs.
The Small Business Difference
As the empirical research on small business capital structure has been limited,^ 
it is difficult to determine whether these theories discussed above are applicable to 
small businesses. Most theorists agree that small businesses are impacted by tax 
shields, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetries to a different 
degree. For example, Pettit and Singer (1985) argue that small businesses experi­
ence a greater impact of bankruptcy, monitoring costs, and information asymmetry 
in comparison to large businesses.
There are three popular theories which help us to understand the role of debt in 
small firms. These theories are outlined below and suggest that the benefits and 
risks of debt are likely to be quite different in small businesses. In particular it is 
expected that external funding is less available, suffers from higher agency costs 
and reduces the independence and utility of the owner.
First, the “finance gap” theory suggests that small firms often find external 
funds more costly and less available. Groves and Harrison (1974) state:
Small companies are hit harder by taxation, face higher investigation costs for 
loans, are generally less well informed on sources of finance, and are less able 
to satisfy lo£in requirements, (p. 228)
Not only do small business owners face problems in finding external funding, 
but they will often need to secure the business loans with personal assets. Ang, Lin, 
and Tyler (1995) believe that these personal commitments cause leverage levels to 
be overstated since the actual asset base should include both personal and business 
assets.
As owner-manager businesses have no separation between the agent and 
equity provider, we would expect that equity agency costs are zero. The ownership 
structure means that the manager is motivated to increase his own equity value. 
However, agency costs of debt are more acute for small firms, as owner-managers 
have greater opportunities to consume perquisites and chaimel funds to them­
selves. Higher agency costs are confirmed by Scherr, Sugrue, and Ward (1990), 
who find that monitoring problems are more severe for small firms in assessing 
and controlling managerial behavior. High monitoring costs of debt have meant 
that lenders to small businesses are usually banks and trade creditors, as they are 
more efficient at monitoring managerial behavior.^
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Second, while debt has higher monitoring costs for small firms, it may also 
carry a lower tax advantage. The combined business and personal incomes of many 
small business owners are often in the low end of the progressive tax schedules. 
Thus in contrast to larger firms, taxes actually favor less not more debt for small 
businesses. Day, Stoll and Whaley (1985) agree that the tax shield is less valuable 
to small firms as they are generally less capital intensive and less profitable.
The smaller tax advantage is also balanced by higher direct and indirect bank­
ruptcy costs. The concept of higher bankruptcy costs is supported by Bradbury and 
Lloyd (1994), who discovered that direct bankruptcy costs are negatively related 
to size. Bankruptcy also carries greater indirect costs to the small business owner, 
such as the loss of self esteem, self employment, and personal assets.
Third, some theorists propose that small business managers follow a unique 
financial objective function. Petty and Bygrave (1993) conclude that a firm’s 
financial objective is largely dependent upon the stage of development of the busi­
ness. While managers of larger firms appear to pursue a goal of wealth maximiza­
tion, small business owners are more concerned with utility maximization. Ang
(1992) argues that small business managers are not only concerned with creating 
wealth, but also with the preservation of control, the avoidance of accountability, 
the preservation of self esteem, the security of self employment and the employ­
ment of friends and family. Therefore, it is expected that these particular concerns 
would be put at risk by a highly levered capital structure.
The owner-manager’s preoccupation with retaining control and avoiding 
accountability may often limit the growth potential of a small business. McMahon
(1993) argues that the desire to maintain control causes owner-managers to mini­
mize the use of outside financing, which in turn may severely limit the develop­
ment of the enterprise. In fact, it was discovered by Davidsson (1989) that forty 
percent of small business owners are not motivated by wealth to increase the size 
of their business. The main two fears given for avoiding growth were the possibil­
ity of a lack of control and a lower well-being of employees. Similarly, an investi­
gation by the Australian National Investment Council (1995) concluded that:
Only two percent of Australian small businesses are growth firms currently seek­
ing out equity (...) taking outside equity increases debt capacity (...) increases 
growth but leads to shared control and increased accountability, (p. 19)
With debt incurring higher bankruptcy costs, lower tax advantages, and lower 
agency advantages to small business owners, one might expect that small busi­
nesses would have less leverage in comparison to larger firms. Norton (1990) con­
firms this idea in a survey which found that small business managers have a greater 
preference for zero debt and are unconcerned about target debt ratios in compari­
son to larger firms.
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However, what we find in reality, is that a perceived lower advantage of debt 
for small businesses does not appear to affect actual leverage ratios. Some studies 
such as Pettit and Singer (1993), Brigham (1969), and Walker (1975) have found 
that leverage is significantly higher for small firms. Similarly, in a study of 86,000 
firms, Davidson and Dutia (1991) discovered that small businesses generally have 
higher debt levels especially in the form of short term debt.^ In contrast, Remmers, 
Stonehill, Wright and Beekhuisen (1974) concluded that size was not a determi­
nant of the leverage ratio in manufacturing firms and Chen and Balke (1979) also 
reported a similar result.
The apparent disagreement of these studies could be due to the difficulty of 
measuring small business capital structure. A true market value for equity is very 
hard to determine except perhaps at the time a business is sold. Ang (1992) points 
out that the leverage ratio for small businesses can be biased due to debt acting like 
“quasi equity” and certain asset and liability items being unreported. In addition, a 
small business owner’s contributions such as low cost loans, low cost labor, and 
free use of personal assets, can often cause equity to be understated.
From the above review of financial literature, it appears that small businesses 
suffer from very high agency costs of debt and insignificant agency costs of inter­
nal equity. Bankruptcy costs are also high and may completely outweigh a smaller 
tax advantage of debt. Added to the fact that the owner-manager pursues a goal of 
maximizing utility rather than wealth, one would expect that small businesses 
would generally prefer to use lower levels of debt.
Certainly, if the agency costs of equity are insignificant and the agency costs 
of debt are very high, one would expect that debt in a small business would actu­
ally increase the combined agency costs in a small business. In fact, the entire role 
of debt would differ in small businesses as they generally gain less from tax 
shields, increased managerial efficiency and monitoring, and reduced asynunetri- 
cal information. Thus, we expect that the most important motivation for using debt 
in a small business would be simply to provide much needed funds.
The Different Circumstances For IPO Firms
An initial public offering (IPO) provides firms with greater access to equity 
funds, greater liquidity, and an avenue for significant growth. It is generally agreed 
that IPOs are timed when stock prices are high and equity capital is cheap. Lough- 
ran & Ritter (1993) confirm this idea with a finding of low IPO stock returns, 
which they documented as 2 % on average for the first two years in comparison to 
15% for mature listed firms.^ This finding indicates that firms are being listed on 
the stock exchange to take advantage of a low cost of equity.
Certainly, IPO firms are likely to have different characteristics in comparison 
to mature-listed firms, and their capital structure is expected to be significantly dif­
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ferent also. In fact, it may be optimal for IPO firms to maintain a conservative cap­
ital structure for several reasons outlined below.
First, IPO firms may suffer from problems of asymmetrical information to a 
lesser extent, as the underwriter’s involvement with the company may decrease the 
information gap. Consequently, the underwriter often acts as a certifying agent and 
disseminator of information. Therefore, the underwriter may absorb some of the 
agency costs which would normally be incurred by investors, and as a result, the 
process may lessen the monitoring advantage of debt.
Second, firms at the IPO stage are usually high growth firms needing capital to 
fund future investments. If a firm is facing high growth opportunities then it would 
probably be better to maintain a higher level of financial slack. Both Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Cornell and Shapiro (1988) agree that firms should try to main­
tain a level of financial slack so that profitable investment opportunities are not 
foregone. The large transaction costs for issuing equity, in terms of both invest­
ment bankers fees and management effort, may also provide an incentive for IPO 
firms to issue more equity than is inmiediately necessary.
Third, Ley land and Pyle (1977) conclude that a high proportion of equity 
retained by insiders signals that insiders value the company’s prospects as high. 
Therefore, IPO firms may initially use less debt in order to signal a high valuation 
of the firm to the market.
Finally, young firms typically have much of their value represented by intan­
gibles such as growth opportunities. The lower proportion of tangible assets will 
discourage funding from debt holders and limit debt capacity. Myers (1977) sup­
ports this idea and argues that debt holders lend less to firms with high growth 
options because managers have an incentive to sub-optimally invest.
In summary, the listing stage of the business life cycle seems to occur when the 
utility gained fi:om retaining control is outweighed by the low cost of equity, desire 
for growth, benefit of greater liquidity, and need for additional financial slack. IPO 
firms are less likely to benefit from the agency advantage of debt because the 
underwriter may already act as a monitor and disseminator of information.
However, the initial public offering stage is where a firm experiences a greater 
diffusion and liquidity of ownership. Agency theory predicts that with diffusion of 
ownership, agency costs should increase, and as a result, we would expect IPO 
firms to gradually take on increasing amounts of debt to counteract agency costs 
and improve managerial efficiency.
m . EMPIRICAL TESTS 
Small Businesses
In order to understand the role of debt at the small business stage we have 
tested the leverage relationships that exist among a set of small owner-manager
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firms. In order to provide a true picture of small business capital structure and 
obtain a market value for equity, we have used a list of owner-manager firms at the 
time the business is sold.
We expect that debt will have no agency advantage to the owner-manager as 
the manager will already act in a way to increase his own personal wealth. In fact, 
debt is expected to decrease the total utility to the owner due to a loss of control, 
added accountability, and an increase in personal risk. Thus, debt is anticipated to 
have a negative agency advantage and to be used only when additional funds are 
necessary.
Data
The first set of data was a list of 99 observations from 35 New Zealand (N.Z.) 
small businesses which had been sold from 1988-1993. This data set was obtained 
on a confidential basis from a number of New Zealand accounting firms. As the 
sample size was considered to be smaller than optimal, a second set of data from 
the United States (U.S.) was also studied. The U.S. data was private information 
obtained from a broker. The data set consisted of 123 observations for sixty five 
U.S. small businesses which had been sold from 1984 to 1991. This list was then 
narrowed down to 50 observations from 35 firms because some of the financial 
data was incomplete.
Methodology
To examine why small business managers use debt, leverage relationships 
were determined using the Spearman’s rank correlation procedure. This form of 
analysis is a non-parametric method which is more suitable for determining rela­
tionships when the data is not normally distributed.
Leverage was calculated using the sale price of the business, for the reason that 
financial statements usually do not accurately measure leverage in small busi­
nesses. Table 1 shows the formulas for each of the variables.
Table 1
Formulas for Spearman’s Rank Analysis
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Key Variable Formulas
LI Term leverage Term liabilities / market equity + total debt
L2 Total leverage Total debt/ Market equity + Total debt
t Unlevered tax rate (Tax paid + Interest expense * Tax rate)
/Net income before tax, interest & depreciation.
s Size Total assets
f Future growth Market Equity: Book equity
opportunities
g Sales Growth % change in yearly sales
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Table 2
Small Business Coefficient Results for Each Variable
Variable
US Term 
Leverage
US Total 
Leverage
NZTerm
Leverage
NZ Total 
Leverage
Tax rate 
Size
Future Growth Opp 
Sales Growth
-.102
+.048
-.172
+.291**
-.053
+.446***
-.084
+.334**
+.099
+.341**
-.061
+.059
+.248*
+.349**
.003
-.042
Note: * .10 level of sig., ** .05 level of sig.,*** .01 level of sig.
Results
The Speannan’s rank analysis identified a positive leverage relationship for 
both size and sales growth. However, there was no evidence to suggest leverage 
was related to tax rates or future growth options. Table 2 shows the results of the 
Spearman’s rank analysis.
The positive correlation between leverage and size found for both U.S. and 
N.Z. firms was very strong. This result is consistent with the work of Bradley and 
Lloyd (1994) who found that bankruptcy costs decrease as a function of size result­
ing in a lower optimal debt level for small firms. The finding is also consistent with 
the finance gap theory and supports the argument that larger firms find external 
funding cheaper and more available. In addition, the idea that the monitoring of 
small firms is more costly to debt holders is also supported by a positive relation­
ship with size.
Second, a significant positive relationship was found for sales growth with 
both measures of leverage for U.S. firms. This finding is consistent with the peck­
ing order theory and supports the idea that small businesses use debt when internal 
funds become limited.
No relationship was found for the tax rate except for a positive correlation with 
total leverage in small NZ businesses. Even so, this relationship was only signifi­
cant at the .10 level. Consequently, the results suggest that the main advantage of 
debt is not tax related for small businesses.
Conclusion
From the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that small firms gain an 
insignificant tax and agency advantage from debt. Instead, a positive relationship 
with sales growth points to the conclusion that debt is generally used out of neces­
sity and is not voluntarily taken on to increase the firm’s performance. A positive 
relationship with size supports the idea that agency costs of debt increase as the 
size of the firm decreases. Therefore, in the light of extremely high agency costs of
debt and no agency costs of internal equity, one could conclude that the agency 
advantage of debt is in fact negative.
IPO Firms
We expect that the agency advantage of debt at the IPO stage is significant but 
is lower in comparison to mature listed firms. Our reasoning is that the IPO process 
may perform a similar role to debt in reducing asymmetrical information through 
the involvement with underwriters. Managers may also have less inclination to 
consume perquisites due to the high growth circumstances generally experienced 
at IPO, which often reduce available cash flows.
Data
A Ust was made of all New Zealand companies which had listed on the stock 
exchange between the period of 1985 and 1989. Annual financial report informa­
tion was collected for all the 112 companies from the financial reports in the Datex 
library files. Datex is a well respected provider of financial information of N.Z. 
listed companies.
Methodology
To determine the value of leverage at the IPO stage, relationships between 
leverage and underpricing were analyzed using the Spearman’s rank correlation 
procedure. Leverage was measured in three ways using term liabiUties, interest 
bearing debt, and total liabilities, as a percentage of total assets.
The observations were also divided into two groups; firms with and firms with­
out term Uabihties. The underpricing for both groups was analyzed and the signif­
icance of any differences was determined through the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
The Spearman’s Rank correlation procedure was used to examine leverage 
relationships with four variables: the tax shield, size, future growth opportunities, 
and sales growth. The variables were calculated using the same formula as shown 
in Table 1 for small businesses, with the exception that leverage was determined 
using book values. Book values were seen as a fair estimate because it is assumed 
that the auditing of listed companies would increase the accuracy of financial data.
Results
The analysis found that:
• underpricing was positively related to leverage
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Table 3
Underpricing Relationships with Three Measures of Leverage
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Lx>ng Term Leverage Total Leverage
Interest Bearing 
Leverage
Coefficient +.222 +.365 +.328
Z value 2.34*** 3.84*** 3.45***
Note: ***significant at the .01 level
Table 4
Differences for Long Term Leverage
Underpricing Firms Without Term Liabilities Firms With Term Liabilities
average 46.14% 56.21%
median 2% 18.67%
standard deviation 83.47% 99.1%
• higher underpricing was experienced by firms with term liabilities
• positive leverage relationships exist for size and tax rates
First, the Spearman’s rank analysis showed that strong positive relationships 
were found for underpricing and all three measures of leverage as seen in Table 3. 
In other words, highly levered IPO stocks have been more underpriced in the 
period from 1985 to 1989.
When the data was divided into two groups, those companies with term liabil­
ities were on average more underpriced than companies without term liabilities as 
shown in Table 4. The median underpricing was particularly higher for firms with 
term liabilities.
Both T tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests did not show that the differences in 
the two groups of firms were significant to point to differences in the mean of the 
two populations, so one can not propose that the difference in underpricing would 
continue to be evident in the 1990s. However, the fact that Spearman’s rank anal­
ysis found a relationship between leverage and term liabilities suggests that debt at 
the IPO stage is valued by the market.
The Spearman’s rank analysis also showed that a significant positive relation­
ship existed for both size and the unlevered tax shield at the IPO stage. But, as 
shown in Table 5, no relationship was found for sales growth or future growth 
opportunities.
Conclusion
The positive relationship between leverage and the unlevered tax shield sug­
gests that the principal benefit of debt is tax related at the IPO stage. The strong
Table 5
Coefficient results from Spearman’s rank analysis
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Variable
Ipo Stage 
Leverage Coefficient
Tax shield .243**
Size .302***
Future growth opportunities .115
Sales growth -.041
Note: * .10 level of significance, ** .05 level of significance, *** .01 level of significance
positive relationship with size also suggests that bankruptcy costs are relevant and 
supports the balancing theory.
The strong tax relationship with leverage may be apparent only because debt 
is not being used by managers for other purposes, such as reducing agency costs. 
This argument points to the conclusion that the agency advantage of debt is insig­
nificant due to the IPO providing similar monitoring and motivating benefits of 
debt. As mentioned earlier, the IPO process often reduces asymmetrical informa­
tion and increases monitoring through involvement with underwriters. The IPO 
may also have a restructuring or “shake up” effect, which may pressure manage­
ment in the same way that debt increases efficiency in mature listed businesses.
Nevertheless, the fact that leverage is positively related to underpricing sug­
gests that the market still values leverage as a tool for reducing agency costs in the 
future. The greater level of underpricing for levered stocks may mean that the mar­
ket values debt in a firm’s capital structure more than investment bankers have 
realized. In contrast, it is highly likely that investment bankers plan for the higher 
underpricing as a compensation for greater risk. The market possibly values debt 
as a means of reducing agency costs in the future and as a tool to ensure that man­
agers are more likely to maximize shareholder wealth.
Mature Listed Businesses
It is expected that the role of debt in mature listed businesses is far from a sim­
ple case of providing a source of funds. With high asymmetrical information 
between investors and managers, high diffusion of ownership, and high agency 
costs, we expect the role of debt will be complex at this stage. We expect that listed 
companies will gradually increase the debt ratio from the IPO to mature listed 
stage in order to benefit from the agency advantage of debt.
Data
Financial information was collected for all New Zealand companies which 
Usted on the stock exchange between 1980 and 1989, and stayed listed for at least
five years. Various financial measures were recorded for the 70 companies in the 
year of IPO and then again five years after listing.
Method
The actual difference in shareholder’s equity was calculated for each year 
from IPO to five years after listing. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was performed 
to determine the significance of the changes.
Relationships for leverage at the five year stage were then examined using the 
Spearman’s rank correlation procedure. The variables were calculated in the same 
way as in the IPO rank analysis.
Results
The analysis found:
• an increase in leverage from year one to year five of listing
• a negative relationship between leverage and future growth opportunities
• an increase in total assets from the IPO to mature listed stage
• a decrease in sales growth from the IPO to mature listed stage
First, leverage was found to significantly increase over the five years. On aver­
age, an extra 2 1 % of total assets were funded by debt in the fifth year of listing 
compared to in the IPO year. The average and median difference in leverage is
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Table 6
Difference in leverage from IPO year
Absolute dijference in leverage from year one of listing to:
year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5
average
median
6.07% 12.61% 16.90% 
2.80% 6.80% 11.62%
21.68%
8.99%
Table 7
Coefficient Results from Spearman’s Rank Analysis
Mature Listed
Variable Leverage Coefficient
Tax shield .159
Size .063
Future grov t^h opportunities -.207**
Sales growth -.046
Note: **05 level of significance.
Table 8
Changes in Total Assets and Sales Growth
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Total Assets (000) Sales Growth
absolute absolute
IPO 5year difference IPO 5year difference
average 266,945 420,310 153,364 236% 35% -201%
median 11,007 19,359 1,966 44% 221% -45%
shown in Table 6 . A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that the increase in 
leverage was significant at the . 0 1  level.
A negative relationship for future growth opportunities was the only signifi­
cant leverage relationship found. Table 7 shows the leverage coefficients for each 
variable determined by the Spearman’s rank analysis.
Third, the analysis found that total assets significantly increase over the 5- year 
period measured, as shown in Table 8 . This result suggests that an unlisted firm’s 
growth may often be constrained by a lack of funds and that listing enables a firm 
to pursue a number of investment opportunities.
This idea is further supported by the finding that sales growth significantly 
decreased from the IPO to the mature listed stage. Thus, listing on the stock 
exchange appears to accompany a significant increase in sales, which then gener­
ally decreases as the business matures. The Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that 
the differences are significant at the . 0 1  level.
Conclusion
From the results of the analysis, it is evident that debt increases considerably 
in the five years after listing. One could argue that increased leverage is caused by 
the adaptation to a new ownership structure which involves greater owner-man- 
ager separation and higher agency costs. Thus, the agency advantage of debt 
appears very strong.
The lower correlation for the tax shield suggests that the agency advantage of 
debt has outweighed the tax and bankruptcy cost relationship which was very 
strong at the IPO stage. Therefore, the agency benefit of debt appears to have much 
significance at the mature listed stage.
The negative leverage correlation with future growth opportunities shows that 
conservative capital structures exist at the mature listed stage for firms with high 
growth options. While maintaining a low level of financial slack is seen as advan­
tageous to increasing managerial efficiency, there is also an argument for firms 
with high growth options to maintain enough financial slack so that profitable 
investment opportunities can be easily invested in. Therefore, it appears that debt
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has a high advantage for mature-listed firms with the exception of firms needing 
considerable financial slack for future growth.
The negative correlation may also point to managers being concerned with 
reducing the cost of capital by issuing the least costly security available. Thus, if a 
firm has a high market to book value through high growth opportunities, then man­
agers are more likely to issue equity to take advantage of a lower relative cost of 
financing.
The findings of high growth at the IPO stage suggest that listing on the stock 
exchange allows a firm to experience its true growth potential, which may have 
been constrained by the small business finance gap. Additionally, BPO firms expe­
riencing high growth may also suffer from limited cashflow which will lessen the 
opportunities for managers to consume perks, and thus lessen the agency advan­
tage of debt.
Table 9
Spearman’s Rank Coefficients for Total Leverage
Variable
US Small 
Business
NZ Small 
Business
IPO
Stage
SYears After 
Listing
Tax shield -.053 .248* .243** .159
size ,446*** .349** 302*** .063
future growth .084 .003 .115 -.207**
opportunities
sales growth .334** -.042 -.041 -.046
Note: *.10 level of significance, **.05 level of significance, ***.01 level of significance
Significant leverage relationships
-0.3
Btax shield 
■s iz e
□fu tu re  growth opportunities 
O sales growth
Figure 1
Bar Graph of Leverage Relationships Determined by Empirical Analysis
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IV. SUMMARY
The analysis shows that leverage relationships vary over the firm life cycle. Table 
9 summarizes the results from the Spearman’s rank analysis for all three stages.
As Figure 1 illustrates, leverage appears to be related to size and sales growth 
at the small firm stage. At the IPO stage the tax and size relationship is very high. 
At the mature listed stage leverage appears to be only correlated with future 
growth options suggesting that the agency advantage of debt has outweighed the 
tax shield benefits.
The following results were also found:
• Higher underpricing for highly levered stocks;
• An increase in leverage and size from IPO to mature listed stage; and
• Significantly higher sales growth at the IPO stage.
V. CONCLUSION
The findings give evidence to conclude that the agency advantage of debt does 
vary from the small, to the IPO, to the mature-listed stage of the firm life-cycle. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the debt advantage over the three stages.
At the small business stage, debt appears to have a negative agency advantage 
due to the negligible agency costs of equity and high agency costs of debt. The evi-
Aaencv advantage of debt
strong
significant
negative
small
rzTZi..
IPO mature-listed
Figure 2
The Change in the Advantage of Debt Over the Firm Life Cycle
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Table 10 
Conclusion Summary
Small IPO Mature Listed
agency benefit of negative significant strong
debt
agency costs nil for internal equity 
very high for debt
partly absorbed by 
underwriter
very high
tax benefit of debt low high high (but with many 
other
debt considerations)
main explaining pecking order theory balancing theory agency theory
theory
probable maximize total utility increase shareholder increase shareholder
considerations in wealth, reduce wealth, reduce costs of
using debt costs of financing financing
dence shows that small firms gain an insignificant agency and tax advantage from 
debt. Instead, the findings point to debt being used in response to a shortage of 
internal funds.
At the IPO stage, the IPO process performs a similar role to debt in reducing 
agency costs, and consequently, debt loses much of its agency advantage. Instead, 
the tax advantage of debt appears to be extremely significant in determining an 
IPO firm’s optimal debt level.
The mature-Usted stage is associated with an increase in debt levels which 
appear to be in response to a new ownership structure. It appears that there is a very 
strong agency advantage of debt which surpasses the tax advantage. However, if a 
firm’s growth options are high, this agency advantage appears to be outweighed by 
the need to maintain financial slack.
Thus, one can conclude that if a firm follows a life cycle fi:om a small business 
to an IPO stage, to a mature listed stage, it is likely to experience increasing agency 
advantages of debt. Further studies examining how managers decide on a firm’s 
optimal debt level would be useful in increasing the understanding of the shifting 
advantage of debt.
NOTES
1. See Ross (1977), Copeland and Lee (1991) and Masulis (1983) for further details of the informa- 
tion hypothesis
2. Research by Shah (1994) also confirms that increasing a firm’s leverage generally lowers an
investor’s assessment of the firm’s risk.
3. Empirical evidence on small business capital structure is limited to a few studies such as Walker 
and Petty (1978) and Day, Stoll and Whaley (1985) and Norton (1990).
4. The efficient monitoring idea may explain why studies such as Davidson & Dutia (1991) have 
found that small businesses have more short term debt.
5. Gupta (1969) Horrigan (1965) and Walker and Petty (1978) have also produced similar results.
6. Aggarwal and Rivdi (1990) also observed poor performance in the first year of listing. Similarly, 
Ibbotson (1975) documented periods of high initial returns and high volume “hot issue” markets.
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